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ABSTRACT

The Genocide Convention is hailed as a great protection mechanism and the one
document that will prevent future destruction of groups. This convention however, has a
variety of shortcomings that fail to protect groups outside of attempted physical
destruction. An article criminalizing cultural genocide is a devastating omission and this
paper seeks to create a working legal definition to be used a framework for creating an
article or convention to provide such criminalization. Beginning with an analysis of the
drafting of the Genocide Convention with particular attention paid to the importance of
culture in the foundation of the convention as well as the debate surrounding the
inclusion of cultural genocide in the final draft. The arguments used to prevent the
inclusion of cultural genocide into the final draft provide insight into the fears of states
and also provided the foundation of the argument for the necessity of the criminalization
of cultural genocide. The second section analyzes the intersection of culture, law, and
genocide. Defining culture as an abstraction is difficult and has to be broken down into
components of culture, which can provide clear legal standards for cultural rights
protection and the criminalization of cultural genocide. An analysis of current cultural
protection mechanisms provides an understanding of the dominant viewpoint of culture
in the international community. Furthermore, this viewpoint provided a majority accepted
definition of cultural components requiring protection that was used to frame a definition
of cultural genocide. The final section explicates the necessity of a definition of cultural
genocide. The remnants of cultural genocide in the Genocide Convention seen in the
prohibition of the forced transfer of children, demonstrates the importance of preventing
loses of culture. Furthermore, the definition of cultural genocide is framed by the existing
definition of genocide, and uses the combination actus reus and dolus specialis in its
determination. Similar to genocide, the final definition of cultural genocide requires the
intent to destroy a group as the distinguishing factor between genocidal acts and human
rights violations.
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I. Genocide and Law
This chapter analyzes the history and drafting of the Genocide Convention; specifically
addressing the formulation of the definition of genocide and the debate surrounding the
inclusion of cultural genocide. Furthermore, this section addresses the controversy
surrounding the inclusion of cultural genocide and its implications on human rights
protections.

The necessity for a definition of genocide and the prosecution of the crime stems
from the individual‟s right to life, which was then expanded to a group‟s right to exist.1
The nature of this crime is so extreme and so grave that it required a law and a
punishment post Nuremberg,
The origins of the convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations to
condemn and punish genocide as a 'crime under international law' involving the denial of
the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of
mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is contrary to the moral law
and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations. The first consequence arising from this
conception is that the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are
recognized by civilized nations as binding on states, even without any conventional
obligation.2

The Convention was not the first document that stated that Genocide was a crime; it was
preceded by a resolution from the General Assembly of the United Nations.3 However,
the Genocide Convention was pivotal is defining and narrowing the concept. The term
genocide comes from the work of Raphael Lemkin which was used as a basis for the
formulation of the definition of genocide during the drafting of the Genocide
Convention.4 Lemkin had a multifaceted approach to genocide and sought to express the
various means of genocide in eight different ways: political, social, cultural, economic,
1

WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2d ed. 2009). ("The prohibition of genocide is
closely related to the right to life, one of the fundamental human rights as defined in international
declarations and conventions.") [ hereinafter SCHABAS], See also, Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory Opinion), [1951] ICJ Reports 16,p.
23.Quoted in Legality of the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), [1996] ICJ Reports
226, para. 31.
2
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory
Opinion), [1951] ICJ Reports 16,p. 23.Quoted in Legality of the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons
(Advisory Opinion), [1996] ICJ Reports 226, para. 31.
3
SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 5.
4
RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government,
Proposals for Redress, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for World Peace (1944), See Generally
WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2009).
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biological, physical, religious, and moral.5 Analyzing the general definition created by
Lemkin, his definition is incredibly broad, considering a plethora of acts to be genocide
including, ". . . nonlethal acts that undermined the liberty, dignity, and personal security
of member of a group . . . [as long as] they contributed to weakening the viability of the
group."6 Furthermore, Lemkin specified that genocide should be criminalized regardless
of whether it was committed during peace or war.7 The broadness of Lemkin‟s definition
allowed the majority of groups to be protected from all means of destruction, even nonviolent ones. The spirit of Lemkin‟s work was supposed to be present in the finalized
convention, however, state interests and negotiations led to a stricter definition.
Prior to the creation of the Genocide Convention, The General Assembly draft
resolution was adopted unanimously on December 11, 1946 and stated that genocide was
a crime and requested the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) prepare a convention
draft.8 The General Assembly resolution gave a general definition of genocide and it is
from this resolution that sparked the creation of the draft a convention. 9 The General
Assembly resolution labeled genocide as an international crime and defined it generally
as the “denial of the right of existence of entire human groups.” 10 Furthermore, the
resolution states that the destruction of a group, in whole or in part, “results in great
losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these
human groups.”11 The text of this particular resolution states that the focus should be on
5

MATTHEW LIPPMAN, THE DRAFTING OF THE 1948 CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF
THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE, 3 B.U. INT'L L. J. 1,2 (1985) (" Political: The destruction of local democratic

institutions and the imposition of German rule; Social: The destruction of indigenous social patters and the
imposition of German law, language, culture, and the deportation of intellectuals; Cultural: the destruction
of national libraries, museums, galleries and educational institutions and the introduction and propagation
of German culture; Economic: The impoverishment of the local, non-German population and the transfer of
economic resources to the local, German population; Biological: The limitation of the birthrate of the local,
non-German population in contrast to the encouragement of births among the local, German population;
Physical: the debilitation and annihilation of the national population; Religious: the destruction of local
religious organizations, shrines and monuments; and Moral: the encouragement of moral debasement and
depravity in occupied territories.").
6
WARD CHURCHILL, Defining the Unthinkable: Towards a Viable Understanding of Genocide, 2 OR. REV.
INT'L L. 3, 11 (2000).
7
Sonali B. Shah, Note, The Oversight of the Last Great International Institution of the Twentieth Century:
The International Criminal Court's Definition of Genocide, 16 EMORY INT'L. REV. 351, 354 (2002).
8
U.N. GAOR, Resolution 96(I), 1st sess., 55th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/86 (Dec. 11, 1946).
9
SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 53.
10
U.N. GAOR, Resolution 96(I), 1st sess., 55th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/86 (Dec. 11, 1946).
11
Id.
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the intent to destroy the group in its entirety; this intent can be found in the phrase “denial
of the right of existence of entire human groups”.12 The text focusing on entire groups
and their contributions to society demonstrates that genocide has a twofold impact; first,
the crime is heinous due to the loss of life and secondly, the crime is grave due to the loss
of cultural contributions. The portion of the resolution that focuses on the cultural
contributions has often been used as the basis for the argument that the General Assembly
acknowledges cultural genocide.13 Furthermore, Resolution 96 (I) states that these crimes
occur when the following groups have been destroyed:“racial, religious, political and
other groups”.14 It is evident from final text, which does not include political or other
groups, that the spirit of this particular resolution has had limited impact upon the final
definition of genocide.
A. The Drafting of the Convention
The General Assembly resolution 96(I) recommended that the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) to study and draft a convention. After research, in 1947,
ECOSOC turned over the drafting to the Secretary-General, whose draft stated that
convention served "to prevent the destruction of racial, national, linguistic, religious or
political groups of human beings."15 The Secretary-General hired Raphael Lemkin as a
consultant for the creation of the first draft of the Convention.16 The Secretariat Draft
mentioned three types of genocide; physical, biological, and cultural, which directly
reflected Lemkin's work.17 After reviewing the draft and receiving comments, the
General Assembly passed Resolution 180 (II) which gave the order to ECOSOC to begin
drafting the text of the convention.18 Lemkin‟s work on the draft was then submitted to an

12

U.N. GAOR, Resolution 96 (I), 1st sess., 55th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/86 (Dec. 11, 1946).
ECOSOC, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting: Lake Success, New
York Tuesday, 8 April 1948 at 2pm,U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.5, reprinted in1 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPA
WEBB, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 726 (2008) (the comments of Mr.
Perez-Perozo from Venezuela used the U.N.G.A. Resolution 96 (I) to form the basis of his arguments that
protection from cultural genocide was necessary as it resulted in the loss of great contributions)
14
U.N. GAOR, Resolution 96 (I), 1st sess., 55th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/86 (Dec. 11, 1946).
15
Secretariat Draft of Genocide Convention, UN Doc. E/447, 17.
16
Ward Churchill, supra note 6, at 13.
17
SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 61.
18
SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 61.
13

3

ad hoc committee to rework the draft based on state concerns in 1948.19 Despite the
passing of the resolution, some states were still opposed not only to cultural genocide, but
to the idea of a Genocide Convention in its entirety. States were very particular about the
contents of the Convention because it would put their actions under intense scrutiny and
possibly make them accountable for genocide. 20 After the draft went to the ad hoc
committee, the ideas espoused in General Assembly Resolution 96(I) and the work of
Raphael Lemkin became less important than state interests.
The drafting of the Convention reveals the political motivations of states and their
fear of potentially being held accountable for their actions after the Convention entered
into force. In the drafting meetings it was proposed that the Committee use three forms of
genocide; physical, biological, and cultural.21 The original definition included all of
these aspects of genocide and had a detailed list of acts that constituted genocide
including, but not limited to: segregation of the sexes, obstacles to marriage, forced
transfer of children, forced exile, prohibiting the use of national language, and destruction
of historic and religious monuments.22 The concept of cultural genocide was originally
accepted as part and parcel of the Genocide Convention. During the beginning of the
drafting of the Convention, the idea of destroying a group was not restricted to physical
means. Despite US objections to the inclusion of cultural genocide, Article III, which was
the intended article concerned with cultural genocide, was accepted into the draft by a six
to one vote.23 The later vote against the inclusion of cultural genocide is not surprising
19

Ward Churchill, supra note 16.
JOHN COOPER, RAPHAEL LEMKIN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 102 (2008) (“ . . .
if political groups were included in the convention, it would call into question Stalin‟s poltically motivated
purges of the kulaks (the betty bourgeois) during the forced collectivizations of agriculture in the late
1920‟s and early 1930‟s.).
21
SCHABAS, supra note 18, See also Florian Jessberger, The Definitions And The Elements of The Crime of
Genocide, in THE UN GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, (Paola Gaeta ed. 2009).
22
U.N. GA, Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and its Codification, Draft
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide at art 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC.10/42/Rev.1 (12
June 1947), reprinted in 1 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPA WEBB, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX
PREPARATOIRES 124 (2008).
23
JOHN COOPER, RAPHAEL LEMKIN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 123 (2008) (“
Article 3 of the proposed convention defined „cultural‟ genocide as destroying the language, religion or
culture of groups by prohibiting the use of a language in daily intercourse or in schools or publications and
demolishing or preventing the use of schools, libraries, historical monuments or places of worship
belonging to a particular group. . . Despite the vehement opposition of the United States to the inclusion of
„cultural‟ genocide in the convention, this article was adopted by six votes to one.”).
20

4

due to the historical context of the creation of the Genocide Convention, which explains
why states were hesitant to support or even adamantly against certain aspects of the
definition. During the drafting of the convention, the USSR had already eliminated
opposition through their political purges and thusly they posited that the inclusion of
political groups would expand the definition of genocide too greatly.24
The cultural genocide amendment was one of the most controversial during the
drafting. It is important to note the historical context of the states involved in creating the
draft in order to highlight the underlying reasons as to why they would be opposed to
inclusion of cultural genocide. During the drafting of the Genocide Convention, cultural
genocide was originally included as a provision, as based on the work of Lemkin.25 The
Secretariats draft originally defined cultural genocide as,
. . . the destruction of the specific character of the targeted group(s) through destruction or
expropriation of its means of economic perpetuation; prohibition or curtailment of its
language; suppression of its religious, social or political practices; destruction or denial of
access to its religious or other sites, shrines or institutions; destruction or denial of use and
access to objects of sacred or sociocultural significance, forced dislocation; expulsion or
dispersal of its members; forced transfer or remove of its children, or any other means.26

This definition of cultural genocide is rather expansive and thusly many states were
adamantly opposed including the United States, for fear of being prosecuted for
genocidal acts they may have committed.27 Once the drafting of the convention was
passed to ECOSOC, the debate continued as many voiced their disapproval of the
inclusion of cultural genocide. ECOSOC defined cultural genocide as destruction by
brutal means [sic] the specific characteristics of a group.”28 The reason for including

24

WARD CHURCHILL, supra note 6, at 14.
SCHABAS, supra note 18.
26
WARD CHURCHILL, supra note 6, at 3.
27
JOHN COOPER, supra note 23.
25

28

ECOSOC, Draft Convent on The Crime of Genocide: Comments on the Draft Convention 234.3,
U.N.Doc. E/447 (26 June 1947), reprinted in Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide at art 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC.10/42/Rev.1 (12 June 1947), reprinted in 1 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPA
WEBB, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 234-236 (2008).
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cultural genocide was that cultural diversity was essential and if a group lost its
distinguishing characteristics, then it failed to exist as a distinct group.29
B. Debating the inclusion of Cultural Genocide
Genocide is an exceptional crime, one that is particularly horrifying and
barbaric.30 The nature of the crime of genocide requires international criminalization as it
impacts not only the specific group harmed but humanity as a whole. 31 Expanding the
definition of genocide was quite controversial as it was argued that genocide was such a
special crime that it would decrease the impact if every act were considered genocide. 32
This is quite understandable given the historical context of the creation of the convention
and the need to prevent future occurrences of such a grave act.

The Genocide

Convention is a huge step forward in the protection of individual and group existence;
however, it is still insufficient in that it leaves a huge gap in protecting group integrity. In
regards to cultural genocide, the only remnant of this idea is the criminalization of the
forced transfer of children.33 The destruction of a distinct group is harmful to humanity as
a whole and this destruction can be achieved through physical and non-physical means.
The use of non-physical means was understood and considered in the drafting of the
Convention through the initial inclusion of an article on cultural genocide.
The potential inclusion of cultural genocide caused numerous debates during the
drafting. The arguments posited by many states often appear hypocritical and unfounded,

29

Id (“ Such a group‟s right to existence was justified not only from the moral point of view, but also from
the point of view of the value of the contribution made by such a group to civilization generally. If the
diversity of cultures were destroyed, it would be as disastrous for civilization as the physical destruction of
nations”).
30
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory
Opinion) [1951] I.C.J. Reports 16, p.23, found in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (
Advisory Opinion), [1996] ICJ Reports 229, para. 31.
31
David Luban, Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN Report, 7 CHI.
J. INT‟L L. 303,309 (2006-2007), See also Nina H.B. Jorgensen, The Definition of Genocide: Joining the dots
in the light of recent practice, 1 INT‟L CRIM. L. REV 285,287 (2001).
32
ECOSOC, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting: Lake Success, New
York Tuesday, 8 April 1948 at 2pm,U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.5, reprinted in1 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPA
WEBB, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 727 (2008).
33
William H. Schabas, Genocide In International Law, 176 (Cambridge Univ. Press UK 2000) (2000).
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especially when combined with their support for human rights protections.34 Although the
atrocities of the Holocaust guided the creation of the definition of genocide, political
interests also played a role in shaping the outcome of the drafting. States were afraid that
any acts that they perpetrated within their own territory could be a crime under the new
convention.35 The dissent of some states was hypocritical as they supported the
criminalization of physical genocide since they had recently committed atrocities,
Such statements contained no small element of hypocrisy coming as they did from a
country [America] which had barely completed a century-long and continent-wide
serious of unabashedly exterminationist campaigns against American Indian peoplesbeing at the time in the midst of a concerted drive to eradicate their cultural residues
through a formal policy of compulsory assimilation- was still wrapping up a similarly
annihilatory operation in the Philippines which had resulted in the slaughter of as many
as a million native "Moros," and was busily emulsifying the previously vibrant
indigenous society of its newly-acquired Hawaiian territory.36

While many different fears were voiced, a common fear was that cultural genocide made
the Convention too broad, states would refuse to ratify it, destroying the tool that nations
created to protect minority groups.37 The idea was to make a minimally invasive
convention that would have universal appeal so as to ensure ratification; the work of the
drafting committee would be useless if it failed to produce a document that would be
binding on states. Furthermore, a broad definition of genocide would go beyond the
parameters of U.N.G.A. Resolution 96(I) and a stricter definition would be easier to agree
on and would make the Convention more effective.38 The blurring of the legal brightline
34

ECOSOC, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide Summary Record of the Third Meeting: Lake Success, New
York Tuesday, 6 April 1948, at 2pm, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.3 (13 April 1948), reprinted in 1 HIRAD
ABTAHI & PHILIPA WEBB, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 699 (2008).
35
Sonali B. Shah, supra note 7, at 355 (“ The United States and the Soviet Union were opposed to
provisions which each anticipated might be used to criticize their own conduct. The Genocide Convention
was drafted at a time when Stalin and his regime had already begun their purges targeting political and
social groups. This, the political forces in effect at the time of the drafting of the Convention contributed to
the formulation of a conservative definition of genocide.”).
36
Ward Churchill, Defining the Unthinkable: Towards a Viable Understanding of Genocide, 2 OR. REV.
INT‟L. L. 3, 9 (2000).
37
JOHN COOPER, supra note 23.
38
ECOSOC, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting: Lake Success, New
York Tuesday, 8 April 1948 at 2pm,U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.5, reprinted in1 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPA
WEBB, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 727 (2008) (“ The CHAIRMAN
warned the Committee against an excessively wide extension of the concept of genocide, which might
possibly exceed the framework traced by the General Assembly. The fact which initiated the General
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for genocide would mean an inadequate criminalization of the crime; therefore, it was
argued that a strict definition was required.39 This particular argument is interesting as it
rests on the assumption that legal texts are black and white and have no room for
interpretation. The request for a clearer brightline is understandable insofar as the work is
done to create a clearer legal text that provides better distinction between what is and is
not considered genocide. Not only that, but the text that was created as the final definition
of genocide is also less than clear and has been interpreted in different ways, for example
the International Criminal for Rwanda has expanded the definition of genocide to include
rape.40 The foundation of the argument that cultural genocide laws were too vague
essentially masked the fear that those particular laws could be interpreted in such a way
that holds powerful states accountable for their wrongdoings. Furthermore, when acts are
compared to the Holocaust in terms of gravity, it is unclear as to what the threshold
would be to reach a Holocaust like crime. Furthermore, the easiest way to compare
suspected genocidal acts to the Holocaust would be the amount of destruction, a body
count, which is not evident in the definition of genocide itself or in the traveux
preparatoires. This would also defeat the purpose of the Genocide Convention in and of
itself as the Convention seeks to prevent another Holocaust like crime. Requiring a
suspected genocide to be similar to the Holocaust based on any arbitrary qualities fails to
prevent a Holocaust like act. It is illogical to attempt to prevent an act through a law
Assembly resolution had been to the systematic massacre of Jews by the nazi authorities during the course
of the last year. Were the Committee to attempt to cover to wide a field in the preparation of a draft
convention for example, in attempting to define cultural genocide- however reprehensible that crime might
be- it might well run the risk to find that some States would refuse to ratify the convention. . . “).
39
Peter Quayle, Unimagnable Evil: The Legislative Limitations of the Genocide Convention, 5 INT‟L CRIM.
L. REV. 364,365 (2005) (“ Lippman notes the contemporaneous warning that “strict definition „must be
rigidly adhered to; otherwise there is a danger of the idea of genocide being expanded indefinitely. . . „ . . .
international law must be „built on a rational and logical basis . . . each idea must be properly defined and
not overlap each other.‟”).
40
Frank Chalk, ‘Genocide in the 20th Century’ Definitions of Genocide and Their Implications for
Prediction and Prevention, 4 HOLOCAUST & GENOCIDE STUD. 149,151 (1989), see also UNGA, Report of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide . . . , 7 Sept.
1999, A/54/315 S/1999/943 available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/annualreports/a54/9925571e.htm (“
The Trial Chamber held that rape, which it defined as "a physical invasion of a sexual nature committed on
a person under circumstances which are coercive", and sexual assault constitute acts of genocide insofar as
they were committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a targeted group, as such. It found that
sexual assault formed an integral part of the process of destroying the Tutsi ethnic group and that the rape
was systematic and had been perpetrated against Tutsi women only, manifesting the specific intent required
for those acts to constitute genocide.”).
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when that law requires that the suspect act be similar to that which you are attempting to
prevent.
The second argument that appeared often was the cultural genocide was not “as
bad” as physical genocide. The acts of physical genocide are barbarous and therefore
needed to be denounced.41 While the idea of mass murder is difficult to imagine and cope
with, it does not mean that murder should be the only crime made illegal. The argument
is illogical on both the international and the national level. When looking to international
law, there are numerous crimes that are prosecuted that do not involve murder. For
example, War Crimes consisting of violations of humanitarian law include not only
unnecessary killing, but also non murderous crimes such as pillaging and unnecessary
destruction of property.42 An examination of national law further undermines this
argument as various crimes ranging from murder to petty theft are punished under
domestic laws.43 The idea that only grave mass murder should be made illegal is not only
unsound but defeats the entire purpose of human rights protections which aims safeguard
all rights of people, not simply the right to life.44 The failure of the international
community to protect cultural rights and cultural existence is not only disappointing but
rather hypocritical when examining the other rights that have been enumerated and
supported by various nations. An idealist view of rights protection and the criminalization
process would state that the most heinous acts are criminalized and all people‟s rights are
41

United Nations, Draft Convention of Genocide: Communications Received by the Secretary-General at §
5 ¶ 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/401 (27 September 1947), reprinted in 1 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPA WEBB, THE
GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 372 (2008).
42
See Generally Geneva Conventions, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S 135 available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/TOPICS?OpenView.
43
WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2d ed. 2009) (“ States ensure the protection of
the right to live of individuals within their jurisdiction by such measures as the prohibition of murder in
criminal law.”).
44
See Generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71
(1948) [ hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A(XXI),
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc.A/6316(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar.
23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. res.
2200A(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.(No.16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976 (hereinafter ICESCR) (this declaration expounds the need to protect all rights ranging
from the right to life to the right to participate in cultural life. The focus of this declaration is not simply on
the right to life. This can also be demonstrated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which particularly espouse the rights
of people beyond the right the life.).

9

protected. In reality, the Genocide Convention was drafted by states which focus on self
interest and the result is not guaranteed to protect the rights of all individuals. This is
where the debate about the state of Genocide Convention is absolutely necessary insofar
as it allows the pin pointing of failures and creates a space for a dialogue which can direct
the changes necessary to make the convention more effective.
Although the reasoning during the drafting debates is more nuanced and complex
than political interest, states were also influenced by their own self interest. Due to the
evidence of self interest, their commitment to various human rights protections is
illogical when analyzed against states refusal to include cultural genocide in the Genocide
Convention. The rights enumerated in various international treaties and declarations
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, and ICESCR show a
commitment by States to the protection of rights beyond the right to life.45 In order for
these rights to be protected, it takes not only a declaration asking states to protect those
rights, but also a means of punishing those who violate those essential rights and laws as
can be seen in prosecutions for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It is
evident by the international prosecution of these crimes that a simple declaration that asks
states to protect rights is not sufficient to ensure their protection.
It was also argued that cultural genocide dealt with human rights and should
therefore be handled in minority rights treaties or declarations. A major proponent of this
argument was the United States, who stated that due to the gravity of creating a new
crime of genocide, only barbarous acts should be considered and those acts considered to
be cultural genocide should be dealt with in human rights treaties.46 France also, agreed
45

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948)(hereinafter
UDHR), see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A(XXI), 21 U.N.
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with the United States that cultural genocide should be included in minority protection
and posited that including “cultural genocide invites the risk of political interference in
the domestic affairs of States.”47 Agreeing with the United States and France, Poland and
India stated that cultural genocide is a minority rights issue and that its inclusion in the
convention would decrease its efficacy.48 The major pitfall of this argument is that it fails
to take into account the importance of a means of punishment to ensure compliance with
human rights doctrine.
Although many states wanted to include cultural genocide, other states saw it as a
sign that they could be open to prosecution because of their assimilation policies.49 New
Zealand even argued that the United Nations could be charged with genocide because the
Trusteeship Council stated that "the now existing tribal structure was an obstacle to the
political and social advancement of the indigenous inhabitants."50 The inclusion of the
cultural genocide article would greatly inhibit state practices as they often valued
assimilation in order to create a cohesive nation. Venezuela argued that states may want
to use an official language in the schools and that might be considered cultural genocide
Genocide in International Context, in CULTURAL GENOCIDE AND ASIAN STATE PERIPHERIES 1,5, (Barry
Sautman ed., Palgrave Macmillan 2006).
47
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rise to great difficulties and as its practical result, it could decrease considerably the number of adherences
to the proposed Convention. The idea of cultural genocide would therefore be more suitably placed either
in a convention on minorities or human rights or even in a separate convention.”), See Also UNGA, Sixth
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unless there was a stricter definition.51 The representative from Brazil furthered the
arguments against cultural genocide provisions by arguing that new states should not
protect minority groups that may oppose assimilation efforts.52 The representative of
Egypt preferred a narrower definition of genocide as he “ . . . expressed the fear that the
concept of cultural genocide might hamper a reasonable policy of assimilation which no
State aiming at national unity could be expected to renounce.”53 The most significant
reason that states‟ refused to include an article on cultural genocide was to protect
themselves from potential prosecution; knowing that some of their policies constituted
cultural genocide. 54 All of these states exhibited a fear that their assimilationist practices
would put them at risk for prosecution for cultural genocide. The states, however, did not
take into account that the purpose of creating definitions of physical and cultural
genocide was to prevent the destruction of a group.55 Furthermore, the dolus specialis
component of genocide creates a threshold so that not every possible state or individual
action can be labeled a genocidal act.56
Even when it was posited that cultural genocide should be in a separate
convention condemning the crime, the proposal was never considered seriously; it is
51

ECOSOC, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide Summary Record of the Fourteenth Meeting: Lake Success,
New York Tuesday, 21 April 1948 at 2: 15 pm,U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.14, reprinted in1 HIRAD ABTAHI &
PHILIPA WEBB, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 887 (2008).
52
U.N.G.A., Sixth Committee to the Genocide Convention: Sixty Third Meeting 30 September 1948, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/SR.63, reprinted in 2 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPA WEBB, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE
TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 1292 (2008).
53
UNGA, Sixth Committee to the Genocide Convention: Sixty Third Meeting 30 September 1948, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/SR.63, reprinted in 2 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPA WEBB, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE
TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 1293 (2008).
54
WARD CHURCHILL, supra note 6, at 9 ("Such statements contained no small element of hypocrisy coming
as they did from a country [America] which had barely completed a century-long and continent-wide
serious of unabashedly exterminationist campaigns against American Indian peoples- being at the time in
the midst of a concerted drive to eradicate their cultural residues through a formal policy of compulsory
assimilation- was still wrapping up a similarly annihilatory operation in the Philippines which had resulted
in the slaughter of as many as a million native "Moros," and was busily emulsifying the previously vibrant
indigenous society of its newly-acquired Hawaiian territory.).
55
ECOSOC, Draft Convent on The Crime of Genocide: Comments on the Draft Convention 234.3,
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evident that states did not consider cultural genocide important enough to include in the
Convention or even in a separate convention.57 Furthermore, states suggested different
scenarios in which minor actions taken by governments could be seen as cultural
genocide without addressing the seriousness of cultural genocide and the requirement of
the intent to destroy a group. States did not analyze the act of cultural genocide parallel to
the physical genocide in terms of the dolus specialis, special intent.58 Both cultural
genocide and physical genocide are characterized by that special intent which means that
in order for an act to be considered genocide outside of the specific acts committed, it
must also be proven that there is an „intent to destroy [a group], in whole or in part . . .‟.59
C. The Genocide Convention
After much debate, the article on cultural genocide was not included in the
Genocide Convention by a six to one vote.60 Despite the defeat of the article on cultural
genocide, this did not erase remnants of cultural genocide from the convention. The
offensive act of forcible transfer of children was considered cultural genocide and, "The
provision is enigmatic because the drafters clearly rejected the concept of cultural
genocide."61 The inclusion of the forcible transfer children is a problematic component of
the Genocide Convention because it does not indicate any physical harm, the damage
done is cultural.62 Even if the possibility exists that the group of children can be
characterized based on the other groups protected in the Convention, the damage done is
57
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not necessarily physical, which directly contradicts the argument states made stressing
the importance of physical damage to genocide.63 Furthermore, in order to be considered
genocide, the forced transfer of the children must be accompanied by the intent to destroy
a particular group; this particular group may differ from the perpetrators based on
ethnicity, religion, race, or nationality, which are all components of defining a distinct
cultural group.64
With cultural genocide excluded from the final draft, the negotiations resulted in the
following text that defines genocide:
Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.65

The text of the convention protects four groups: national, ethnical, racial, and religious.
The definition of genocide poses some major problems when it comes to protecting
minorities and indigenous groups around the world. There are certain aspects of the
convention that are antiquated and simply missing, which allows perpetrators to get away
with massive violations. The first problem is in the list of protected groups. The
convention protects racial groups, although it has currently been accepted that 'race' does
63
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not exist as a scientific concept.66 The concept of race at the time of the drafting of the
convention was broad and incorporated ethnicity as well, however in recent years,
scientists and law makers have moved away from using race as a term to distinguish
between groups.67 Another problem is that the convention leaves out cultural groups,
which means that groups of people with shared values, languages, and customs which
may need an increased protection, particularly in Latin America and Africa.68 Not only
are the protected groups limited, but the entire definition is limited in scope which means
that there are a number of situations that seem to be genocide but do not fit the definition
provided.69 The fact that certain groups are not protected based on distinctions such as
disability, sexual orientation, political orientation, or gender, would allow their
destruction to potentially go unpunished to the fullest extent, "[i ]t would reprehensible if
the world would not condemn massive slaughter of members of a group . . . simply
because of a preordained idea of what types of groups are qualified for coverage under
the [Genocide] Convention."70
The Genocide Convention also fails to criminalize the destruction of all possible
groups by leaving out political and social groups. This prevents the condemnation of all
acts that had the intent to destroy a group, for example the removal of Soviet civilians
and the murder of homosexuals during the holocaust.71 The fact that so many groups are
left outside of the scope of the convention means that they will have to turn to their
respective national courts or tribunals for justice. However the crimes would not have the
stigma of genocide attached to it.72 The problem with seeking justice at a national level
is that if the genocidal plan is widespread, systematic and being perpetrated by the
66
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government, then no legal recourse exists on a local level. These problems demonstrate
the necessity for major changed within the Genocide Convention and the interpretation of
genocide to ensure protection for groups. Furthermore, the lack of an inclusive definition
of genocide means that more time is spent deciding whether something is technically
genocide in instances where situations are dire.73 This means that courts are unable to
make a decision about the genocidal nature of a situation, which can slow state action,
The limited legal meaning of genocide has been stretched by some courts to better
fit its rhetorical use. The consequence is a complex and uncertain law-Darfur
burned and bled whilst a legal determination of genocide was awaited. The
Genocide Convention describes with sufficient precision a single historical event,
an unimaginable, unrepeatable evil. But, in its modern application, the Genocide
Convention kills more people that it protects or prosecutes.74
The Genocide Convention paralyzes the international community and allows individuals
to go unpunished and allows crimes to continue which is antithetical to the entire idea of
a Genocide Convention. The uncertainty of genocide law prevents the international
community from labeling acts genocidal which limits the ability of the international
community to hold states and specific individuals accountable for their actions. The lack
of cohesive case law defining this crime and the fact that it leaves so many groups
unprotected requires a revamping of the convention and of the definition of genocide in
its entirety. The preceding reasons demonstrate the need to change the genocide
convention in many aspects. The Convention is currently not sufficient to adequately
protect many people from the currently defined genocidal acts as well as acts categorized
as cultural genocide.
73
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The lack of a provision for cultural genocide is surprising due to the fact that the
States voted to include forced transfer of children as act to be included in the final
convention. The inclusion of forced transfer as a crime is puzzling due to the fact that is
goes directly against major statements that the Convention should be focused on physical
destruction. First, forced transfer results directly in a loss of culture immediately.75
Children that are removed from their homes will be acculturated in a completely different
environment and will lose ties to their language, religion, and entire cultural identity. 76
Furthermore, forced transfer does not directly lead to physical harm. 77 The
Representative from Venezuela concluded that including the forced transfer of children
as an act of genocide,
. . . the Committee implicitly recognized that a group could be destroyed
although the individual members of it continue to live normally without having
suffered physical harm. Sub-paragraph 5 of article II had been adopted because
the forced transfer of children to a group where they would be given an education
different from that of their own group, and would have new customs, a new
religion and probably a new language, was in practice tantamount to the
destruction of their group, whose future depended on that generation of children.
Such transfer might be made from a group with a low standard of civilization and
living in conditions both unhealthy and primitive, to a highly civilized group as
members of which the children would suffer no physical harm, and would indeed
enjoy an existence which was materially much better; in such a case there would
be no question of mass murder, mutilation, or torture or malnutrition; yet if the
intent of the transfer were the destruction of the group, a crime of genocide would
undoubtedly have been committed.78
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The inclusion of forced transfer of children counters the argument that the acts included
in the convention must directly cause physical harm.79 This also demonstrates that states
understood the importance of culture but were unable to weigh that against protection
from prosecution based on their own practices. The fact that states could have been
prosecuted for their own actions based on the proposed article of cultural genocide does
not necessitate that it should not be criminalized. States have an irrational fear of
prosecution as cultural genocide is distinct from assimilation and would only be aimed at
drastic measures taken to destroy a group.80 Cultural genocide laws would not inhibit
assimilation practices in so far as they are not an attempt to destroy a group; this is found
in the special intent component of genocide.81 States that fear the criminalization of
assimilation policies have not grasped the difference between that and cultural genocide,
which is the intent to exterminate a groups‟ existence.82
The drafting of the Genocide Convention resulted in a legal text that is
insufficient to protect groups from physical and non-physical forms of destruction.
Analyzing the history of the Convention and the negotiations made during the drafting of
the final text, it becomes evident that state interest played a significantly larger role in
determining the definition of genocide than did the promise to protect groups from
multiple forms of destruction. The beginning of the Genocide Convention, in General
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Assembly Resolution 96(I) demonstrates and international consensus about the nature of
genocide and the importance of protecting not only the lives of group members, but their
cultural contributions as well.83 Furthermore, the remnants of cultural genocide left in the
Convention via the criminalization of the forced transfer of children, demonstrates the
importance of protecting culture and a group‟s existence as a distinct entity. This analysis
creates the impetus to define and criminalize cultural genocide; as destroying a group‟s
distinct characteristics destroys the group in its entirety. As long as cultural genocide
remains an act without a punishment, the international community jeopardizes not only a
group‟s existence, but the foundation of the human rights framework, that promises rights
protections for all humans.
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II. Culture, Law and Genocide
This section seeks to analyze the relation between culture, law and genocide. The
importance of culture has been demonstrated throughout the drafting of the Genocide
Convention. However, this chapter seeks to define culture in a way that can provide clear
legal standards for the creation of a definition of cultural genocide.

The drafting of the Genocide Convention demonstrates the complexity of state
relationships and the power of state self interest.. The importance of culture is found not
only in the General Assembly resolution, but also in the words of the states that were
proponents of the article on cultural genocide.84 The importance of culture as an aspect of
human uniqueness and its importance to social groups is evident; the loss of culture
means that a group ceases to exist as a distinct group.85 Kurt Mundorff expounds upon
this idea:
A group is comprised of its individuals, but also of its history, traditions, the relation
between the group members, and the relationship with other groups, etc. Even without
moving into what can be described as cultural genocide it can certainly be argued that a
group is destroyed already when its components, besides the physical lives of the group
members, are eliminated.86

This idea is central make to the formation of the concept of genocide, which requires that
we understand culture as a component of „groups‟ listed in the Genocide Convention.
These groups cannot be distinguished if there are not characteristics that make them
different from surrounding peoples. In the creation of the Genocide Convention, this can
be seen in the work of Raphael Lemkin, who emphasized that physical and cultural
existence are one in the same insofar as “ an attack on [a group‟s] physical existence is
also an attack on its cultural existence , and vice versa.”87
84
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The importance of culture to the existence of a group, whether ethnical, national,
religious, etc., brings about the creation of cultural rights on a national and international
level.88 It is this combination of rights that ensures the ability of people to be different
publicly and privately - that protects the existence of minority groups and allows them to
shape their cultural identity.89 Understanding that these rights are essential is not simply
enough to create the impetus to criminalizing cultural genocide. Culture shapes our world
view, our view of human rights, our reasons for protecting human rights, and our fear of
differing cultures.90 It is therefore necessary to understand what culture is and its
components in order to reshape our thinking on cultural genocide and analyze the reasons
as to why it was not included in the Genocide Convention.
The current human rights doctrine is based in a worldview perpetuated by
powerful states, the arguable lack of sensitivity to other cultures comes from a one-sided
view of the world.91 The West, in particular has had the leading role in developing the
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current human rights regime.92 This view creates a cultural upbringing that tends to focus
on the individual rather than the community and can also be seen in the way that these
human rights are protected internationally.93 It is this view of human rights along with the
rise of xenophobia which requires the protection of culture and cultural rights as to ensure
the survival of distinct viewpoints, rich practices, and differing opinions.94 It is for these
reasons that this section seeks to understand the components of culture, its relation to law,
and its place in genocide law.
A. Culture Defined
In seeking to create a cultural genocide law, one must begin with understanding
culture. It is essential to understand what culture is and its components in order to create
laws that protect such an abstract concept. The difficulty of cultural rights is in the
definition of culture which constantly changes.95 This concept is not fully defined in
international law nor is there a standard definition in anthropology. The concept of
culture in anthropology differs across the spectrum, with definitions of culture ranging
from morals and values to entire societal institutions.96 Some anthropologists believe
culture is exclusively learned while other champion genetic influences.97 Some
anthropologists argue that culture is exclusively ideas while others contend that culture
consists of ideas and their associated activities.98 These arguments within the
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anthropological community demonstrate the vagueness of the concept of culture. The
lack of a standard definition of culture not only makes it harder to understand, but also
lends credence to the view of culture as an intellectual abstraction,
Despite the fact that we talk of culture as something “real”, as something that
exists “out there”, culture is, in fact, an intellectual construct used for describing
(and explaining) a complex cluster of human behaviors, ideas, emotions, and
artifacts.99
Starting from the idea that culture in its broad sense is an abstraction necessitates that we
extrapolate from this concept, the components that allow people to see, experience,
identify with, and intellectualize culture.
Despite a cohesive understanding of the specifics of culture, there is agreement on
the basics of culture and how it manifests itself in groups.100 Broadly culture can be
defined as a way of life, as patterns of living that controls social interactions.101 This way
of life has its basis in ideas that are transmitted between people: this is the way the
culture spreads and eventually guides an entire group of people.102 These ideas influence
things such as religion, food, writing, art, music, and customs of marriage and
relationships.103 The combination of these things creates a complex whole that include all
beliefs, artifacts, and “products of human activity as determined by these habits.”104 This
view of culture is used as it provides an understanding of the way in which cultural habits
permeate a group. Furthermore, this understanding of culture provides a basic foundation
for the exploration of culture as it relates to groups and the creation of cultural law and
genocide law.

99

Robert Borofsky, Studying “Culture Scientifically is an Oxymoron, in EXPLAINING CULTURE
SCIENTIFICALLY 275,281 ( Melissa J. Brown ed., 2008).
100
MARVIN HARRIS, supra note 96, see also DAN SPERBER, EXPLAINING CULTURE: A NATURALISTIC
APPROACH 1 (1996).
101
L. Damen, Culture Learning: The Fifth Dimension of the Language Classroom, (1989) Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley.
102
DAN SPERBER, EXPLAINING CULTURE: A NATURALISTIC APPROACH 1 (1996).
103
Id.
104
Clyde Kluckhohn & William H. Kelly, The Concept of Culture,in THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN THE WORLD
CRISIS 78-106, (Ralph Linton ed., 1980) ,reprinted in CULTURAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE
AND INDIGENOUS 100,103 (James A.R. Nafziger, Robert Kirkwood Paterson, Alison Dundes Renteln eds.,
2010).

23

It also recognized that culture is not stagnate and not all in culture is shared.105
Many members in a community do not necessarily agree about every single practice
within a particular culture; however the overarching ideals tend to be passed on because
they help perpetuate the way of life of the group.106 The impact of the inconsistency of
culture is that although there are general ideas and practices that permeate a specific
group and that distinguish them from another distinct group; culture is fluid and
constantly changing or evolving. Culture is also not consistent within a particular cultural
group itself, as certain aspects of culture may not be evident in every member of that
particular group. The lack of the constant existence of culture in every member of a group
lends itself to the idea that culture abstract and difficult to define. The impact of this is
that the intellectual abstraction of culture is not something on which law can be based as
it is fluid and inconsistent. Therefore, law can be based, not on the idea of culture, but
rather cultural components that are more tangible and easily understood; thereby creating
the possibility of clear legal brightlines and standards.
Law has to outline the components of culture in order to create a legal framework
in which to protect culture. Creating laws that simply say to protect culture provides no
clear roadmap for international or state action. Furthermore, the vagueness of the
abstraction that is simply “culture” allows for states to interpret it differently, which does
not result in a universal and equal protection of rights for all. For example, one of the
most conspicuous aspects of culture is language. Language and culture are linked and
interdependent insofar as languages define the social group and the language depends on
the perpetuation of the group‟s way of life and continuation of the culture for survival.107
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The importance of language is seen in the way that language shapes our world view and
explains the world around us.108 This means that groups with different languages are
likely to have different outlooks.109 The example of language provides a framework with
which law can evaluate language in order to protect it. Law must seek tangible aspects
that are essential when distinguishing between groups and that are essential to the
existence and integrity of a specific group. This allows laws to be created that specifically
detail the necessary actions states should take in order to protect cultural components and
thus culture as an ideal.
B. Culture and Law
In the previous chapter, the details of the negotiations during the drafting of the
Genocide Convention highlight the particular arguments that were used to keep the
cultural genocide article out of the final draft. One of those arguments contended that
cultural genocide should be relegated to the realm of human rights, in particular minority
rights.110 Although cultural genocide was not criminalized in the Genocide Convention,
existing cultural protection exists in the form of human rights treaties and agreements.
These existing cultural protections provide the framework for the international
understanding of cultural rights. In the realm of international law, the priority is not with
understanding the abstraction that is the idea of culture. Unlike in anthropology,
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understanding culture in a legal framework requires that we focus on the components of
culture,
[sic] it is not necessary to define the concept of „culture‟ itself, it is necessary, at least in
general terms, to identify the components of „culture‟ or „cultural life‟ as protected by the
standards in order to delineate their content and associated state obligations.111

International instruments need to provide clear standards to which states can adhere. In
order to provide these clear standards, the human rights framework should not use the
vague construct of culture. The impact of this is that cultural law in the human rights
framework tends to protect cultural components and is characterized by a more
characteristic-focused approach to culture rather than the exploratory view of culture held
by anthropologists.
There are many definitions of culture in international law; however, within the
framework of the United Nations, there are essentially three levels at which cultural
rights are examined.112 The first is the level is the material aspects of culture including
artifacts; the second level includes the artistic and scientific creations of a particular
culture; and finally,
Culture in its anthropological sense, i.e. culture as a way of life or, in UNESCO‟s
words, the “set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of
society or a social group”; it encompasses “in addition to art and literature, lifestyles,
ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs”. In this system-oriented
understanding of culture, the individual is seen as a product of a cultural system.113

This functional view of culture is essential due to the fact that the international
community cannot “protect” every single aspect of culture as forces outside of the natural
change in culture, such as globalization, can have a profound impact on the integrity of a
specific culture. In the instance of culture law has to differentiate between essential and
non-essential rights in order to determine which aspects need to be protected.114 The
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concept of culture is extremely complex and definitions vary, and the list of components
of culture can be infinite, therefore law must look to the “essential” components of
culture in order to create a clear legal standard that is enforceable and effective. This
view of culture is the dominant view in the international legal perspective of culture. This
view of culture creates rights that protect specific features of a culture, those that strongly
contribute to the cultural identity of a group, such as language.115

1. UNESCO and Culture Defined
The key organization in protection culture is the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). UNESCO is the promoter of
international diversity, and, therefore, its research and programs are extremely influential
in the creation of laws protecting culture. UNESCO defines culture in many different
ways according to different qualities. These include intangible culture, cultural
patrimony, cultural heritage, cultural content, and cultural expressions; all of which
provide the framework for the creation of cultural law.116 The framework begins with
cultural heritage, the overarching broad concept that includes all manifestations of a
particular culture which have been inherited.117 Next, intangible cultural heritage,
UNESCO defines this as the “practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills –
as well as the instruments, objects, artifacts and cultural spaces” belonging to a specific
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culture.118 UNESCO states that these are passed throughout generations, and this is what
provides or creates the sense of cultural identity.119 This overarching idea of intangible
cultural heritage is one part of what makes the group distinct.
A part of this intangible heritage is the cultural patrimony of a group. Cultural
patrimony is defined as that which is so fundamental to a group that it is inalienable from
it.120 Cultural patrimony, as with intangible cultural heritage, includes artifacts as well as
folklore and language.121 Also distinct from these aspects are the ideas of cultural content
and cultural expression. UNESCO adopted a Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of Diversity of Cultural Expression in which it defines the difference between
the two.122 Cultural content deals specifically with symbolism and artistic aspects that
express culture, whereas cultural expressions are those that come from the creativity of
people or groups that have cultural content, for example cultural content consists of the
values and symbolism of a society, whereas a cultural expression would be music, poetry
or theater of that particular society.123 This heavily detailed view of culture allows
UNESCO to provide clear guidelines as to what should be protected and what actions s
should take in order to fulfill their obligations. Furthermore, these definitions provide the
framework of cultural law, as the previous definitions determine the relationship between
groups as culture; cultural law refers specifically to the interaction between culture and
the law.124
A delicate balance is needed in order to combine the need for clear legal standards
with the abstract nature of culture. Therefore, culture needs to be broken down into
components that law can protect, as the term „culture‟ is too vague to protect as a whole.
This is seen in the work of UNESCO, which strives to protect culture as a whole, but
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breaks the idea of culture down into protectable components. For example, UNESCO
lists the items considered cultural heritage and they include, but are not limited to:
monuments, architectural works, inscriptions, cave dwellings, buildings, and
archeological sites.125 In order for UNESCO to adequately protect culture it has to draft
conventions that created clear legal standards. In an effort to protect culture in its entirety,
UNESCO created a definition of cultural heritage that would list protectable components.
2. Cultural Protection Obligations in Treaties
Culture and law are inseparable because “ law embodies culture and formalizes its
norms, law promotes, protects, conditions, and limits cultural attributes and expressions,
law harmonizes cross-cultural differences , . . . culture reinforces legal rules, [and]
culture conditions [sic] the adoption, interpretation, and vitality of legal rules.”126 The
symbiotic nature between culture and law demonstrates generally that the two cannot
exist without each other. It is the changes in law and changes in culture that allow for the
creation of new rules and new norms that can provide human rights protections. Cultural
law has its beginnings in The Hague Conferences in which regulations were codified that
protected cultural heritage in times of war.127 The formation of this law throughout
modern times created international instruments that speak of culture in terms of rights;
rights which are guaranteed regardless of the person and has been construed to provide
protection of culture for all groups including indigenous peoples.128 These rights can be
interpreted in a way that creates a myriad of protections and rights including rights to
traditional activities, rights to live in reserves.129 Furthermore, the rights in cultural law
can be extrapolated to create positive legal obligations to ensure that people of different
cultures not only have cultural freedom, but also have the ability to participate in
decisions that affect them.130
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The international framework that protects culture consists of conventions and
agreements that create state obligations. The evolution of cultural law begins with the
earliest agreements – the Roerich Pact in 1935 and the Hague Conventions.131 The
Roerich Pact focused on the protection of monument in the Western Hemisphere and the
Hague Conventions provided protections for cultural heritage in times of armed
conflict.132 The Hague conventions protect against seizure, pillage, and damage to
cultural heritage. However they did not provide protection in peaceful times and the
Roerich Pact did not provide a universal standard of protection.133 The lack of a universal
standard of protection and value of cultural heritage gave birth to the expansion of the
cultural protection regime. There are many treaties that protect cultural heritage,
including, but not limited to: the UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and natural Heritage, the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of Diversity of Cultural Expression, and the UNESCO Convention for the
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. These conventions create the
foundation from which lawmakers can understand culture, can manage state obligations,
and can help shape the framework of a definition of cultural genocide. The definition of
cultural genocide, in order to be accepted, should be couched in an accepted precedent of
the international concept of culture and cultural protections. This ensures that states will
be more willing to embrace the criminalization of cultural genocide as they are already
bound to protect culture in a similar fashion through other agreements.
The analysis of the current cultural protection regime begins with the Declaration
of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation. This declaration from UNESCO
is the cornerstone of cultural heritage protection. The declaration states first and foremost
that the “wide diffusion of culture and the education of humanity for justice and liberty
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and peace are indispensible to the dignity of man.”134 Immediately this makes culture and
inalienable right t as it is essential to the existence of human and human dignity.
Furthermore, Article 1 states that ever culture has a value that must be preserved and that
every person has the right to develop their culture.135 Secondly, this declaration states that
the existence of different cultures and the dissemination of ideas across cultures “. . . is
essential to creative activity, [and] the pursuit of truth.”136 The impact of this declaration
is three- fold: first, it creates an undeniable link between the progression of man and the
protection of culture; secondly, it demonstrates the importance of different viewpoints in
order to facilitate intellectual growth; and finally, it creates an impetus for international
coordination and in the protection and preservation of cultural heritage.
Despite the importance of the declaration in framing the international view of
cultural protection, it lacks a strong enforcement mechanism and does not create clear
state obligations. The lack of an enforcement mechanism is a recurring them in the
treaties concerning cultural heritage. The lack of a punishment for acting contrary to state
obligations or even acting to destroy a particular culture means that states have no reason
to actively protect cultural heritage. This makes the criminalization of cultural genocide
even more important as it provides the essential enforcement mechanism that cannot be
provided by conventions and declarations. This is especially important as the link
between man and culture necessitates protection and specifically requires laws that can be
enforced. The lack on an enforcement mechanism evident in cultural protection
conventions can be mitigated by a definition of cultural genocide that would provide
individual criminal responsibility and more state accountability for cultural destruction.
Another convention that is important to the cultural protection regime is The
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer Ownership of Cultural Property, and it has a more practical purpose. Similar to
the International Cultural Co-operational Declaration, this convention espouses the
importance of international cooperation for the protection of cultural heritage. However,
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practically it created “multilateral control over the movement of cultural property” and it
specifies specific aspects of cultural and archaeological importance that ought to be
protected by states in cooperation.137 The impact of this convention is not simply
regulations on the transfer of cultural heritage; this creates clear state obligations in
protecting and maintaining its own cultural heritage as well as the heritage of other
states.138 Furthermore, it also gives a detailed list of specific natural and man-made
artifacts and expressions of culture, archaeology, and natural history that need to be
protected. This list can serve as a starting point to determine what aspects of culture
should be protected in a law criminalizing cultural genocide and can and will be
instrumental in forming the actus reus of the crime. Once again however, there is no
article that laws out the roadmap for states that have violated their obligations. There are
no guidelines for punishment, outside of normal state to state means that would punish
violators, or what should be done to protect the endangered aspects of culture from
further damage.
Another convention that provides a deeper understanding of the cultural heritage
protection regime is the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage. This convention created the World Heritage list and the parties to the
Convention agree to maintain these sites of valuable cultural heritage and create plans for
sustainable tourism.139 This convention is especially important as it explains the threat to
cultural heritage and the importance of maintaining these aspects of cultural heritage for
future generations. In particular, the convention takes into consideration,
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“[sic] the existing international conventions, recommendations, and resolutions
concerning cultural and natural property demonstrate the importance for all the peoples of
the world, of safeguarding this unique and irreplaceable property, to whatever people it
may belong.”140

This convention requires states to create legislation to maintain and protect their cultural
heritage sites nationally.141 Furthermore, this convention requires international
cooperation in the protection of cultural heritage by creating a committee that would
provide assistance as needed by states for cultural heritage protection.142 This
requirement for international intervention or assistance in order to protect culture is
important for two reasons: first, it puts the responsibility of the protection of cultural
heritage on all states, and secondly, it elevates the impact of cultural destruction from a
group level or national level to an international level. This elevation means that the loss
of culture has an impact on the entire world. It is not simply an affront to a specific
group, but it is a crime against all of humanity. This elevation is similar to the elevation
of genocide insofar as states recognize that the barbarity of the crime does not just impact
the group targeted, but it impacts the entire world.
Another important document is the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural
Diversity. Even though this is not a binding convention it explains the importance of
cultural diversity and its impact on the world as a whole.143 This declaration states that
respect for cultural diversity aids in the guarantee of international peace and that cultural
pluralism is essential to the democratic framework.144 What is arguably most important in
regards to cultural genocide is the analysis in the declaration that makes human rights and
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cultural rights indivisible.145 This declaration states that cultural protections are also a
commitment to human rights and furthermore, cultural rights are an important component
of human rights in general.146 In failing to protect cultural rights, one is also failing to
protect human rights and vice versa. Another important document is the Convention on
the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression. As a recent
convention, it draws upon the spirit of previous conventions on the protection of cultural
heritage and explains the value and importance of culture and culture expressions to the
free flow of ideas and exchange of knowledge.147 This convention seeks to protect all
cultures and “the free flow of diverse ideas, words, and images.”148 Particularly striking is
Article 4 which reads,
“The defence of cultural diversity is an ethical imperative, inseparable from respect for
human dignity. It implies a commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms, in
particular the rights of persons belonging to minorities and those of indigenous
peoples.”149

This article removes the idea of law from the necessity of promoting cultural rights; the
protection of cultural rights is no longer something states are legally obligated to do, but
it is also something they are ethically and morally obligated to do.

3. Cultural Protection as a Duty
This ethical and moral obligation exists independent of the legal obligation;
however it is the ethical obligation that gives rise to the legal one. Despite opposition
from states about the protection of cultural rights and downright denial for the
criminalization of cultural genocide, states are ethically obligated to protect cultural
rights. The sphere of cultural rights protection consists not only of international
organizations such as UNESCO, but also exists within the human rights framework and
requires states to take specific positive actions in order to ensure the promotion and
protection of those rights. Similar to the right to life, individuals also have the right to
145

UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, supra note 143, at art.4-5.
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, supra note 143, at art.4-5.
147
James A.R. Nafziger, Robert Kirkwood Paterson, Alison Dundes Renteln, Cultural Material- Protection
and Cooperation, in CULTURAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE AND INDIGENOUS 252,292 (James
A.R. Nafziger, Robert Kirkwood Paterson, Alison Dundes Renteln eds., 2010).
148
Id.
149
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, supra note 143, at art 4.
146

34

participate in cultural life.150 Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is the right to take part in cultural life; it also
“indicates the importance of the principle of participation in the enjoyment of cultural
rights. This encompasses both the right to have access to a cultural life and to participate
in that cultural life.”151
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights explains the importance
of cultural rights by stating that the ability to participate in cultural life is interdependent
on other rights enshrined in the ICESCR.152 This also imposes on states two obligations
in order to ensure its protection: it requires abstention, meaning non-interference in
cultural practices and the exchange of cultural goods, as well as positive actions to ensure
access to and preservation of cultural heritage.153 In terms of accountability, the
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural states that alleged violations will be
investigated and that the results will be publicized.154 This particular convention does not
allow individual complaints, so there is no option for the individual to claim a violation
directly to the committee. The lack of an individual complaint mechanism prevents states
from being held fully accountable for all violations; it also denies individual victims
access to justice as they are forced to see „local‟ solutions for their rights violations.
Furthermore, if we look to other conventions that allow individual complaints,
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, if the committee
concludes that your rights have been violated a state has three months to show it has
remedied the situation and the examples offered include granting compensation or release
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from detention.155Once again, international conventions fail to offer a real remedy that
would be effective in curbing the destruction of culture. Furthermore, a remedy of
compensation would fail to equate to the loss of cultural diversity. The payment of
compensation is retroactive and would not be able to replace the major aspects of a
culture that have been effectively destroyed, depending on whether a culture was
destroyed partly or in its entirety.
With conventions lacking individual complaint mechanisms, requiring
compensation, or a promise of compensation or attempts to redress a violation, they lack
a strong enforcement mechanism. However, what these conventions do provide are
descriptions of the obligations states have in the regime of cultural rights. An
understanding of these obligations serves as the foundation for the reasons that cultural
genocide should be criminalized. Specifically, in the cultural rights regime, there are
three distinct components of state obligation,
Three elements of obligation with regard to the right to take part in cultural life can be
identified: recognition, protection, and promotion of cultural identity. At the most basic
level, the state has an obligation to recognize (if not endorse) the existence of different
cultures, and ensure the right of individuals to take part in that cultural life and the
components of that right. This may require more than a policy of non-interference and
inaction. If the entitlement is to be meaningful as a human right, then it is not enough
merely to refrain from hindering the enjoyment of cultural rights by persons belonging to
minorities.156

These components of obligation create a space in which cultural expression is not only
protected but maximized. The existence of these obligations to protect cultural heritage
demonstrate the importance of cultural diversity to the human experience. There is no
significant difference in state obligations between the protection of culture and the
criminalization of culture genocide. The difference however, is in the international
recognition of crime, but also in the different enforcement mechanisms. In the current
regime that is convention based, states simply have to prove that they are attempting to
remedy the situation, whereas the criminalization of cultural genocide would provide a
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legal remedy and punishment for those who attempt to destroy a culture „in whole or in
part‟.157

C. Culture and Genocide
In the previous chapter, the creation of the Genocide Convention was chronicled
and analyzed. The process by which the Genocide Convention was created ultimately
resulted in the deletion of the cultural genocide article from the final draft.158 The result
of this deletion is that cultural protections have been relocated to the realm of human
rights protections. However, very little attention is paid to cultural rights outside of the
work of UNESCO, and within UNESCO there are no major enforcement mechanisms.159
Although the work of UNESCO and other organizations have been very successful in the
protection of aspects of cultural heritage, it still lacks the major enforcement mechanisms
to punish states that attempt to destroy particular cultures or cultural components. While
cultural genocide was being debated in the committees drafting the Genocide
Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was also being drafted, and,
therefore, was supposed to address aspects of cultural genocide and provide for that
protection where the Genocide Convention would not.160
There are many acts which destroy a groups‟ culture that can give rise to the
destruction of the group itself. For example, one of the key components of culture is
language and history has shown that linguistic pluralism can be seen as a threat to
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society, assimilation and ultimately homogenization.161 During times of war, leaders
often persecute those who are culturally, linguistically related to the enemy of that time.
162

Linguisitic pluralism is often feared,
Individuals and societies often feel threatened by linguistic pluralism. The confusion of
other languages is therefore often viewed not simply as a problem but also as an actual
danger to society. . . In modern times members of minority groups who continue to
speak their first languages may be viewed in more secular terms as a threat to the larger
community of a magnitude that requires political or legal response. During time of war or
other national emergency, in particular, leaders sometimes attack particular foreign
languages because of the symbolic identities of those languages with enemies.163

In the United States, there was an Anti-German movement during World War I.164 This
is not the only instance of persecution based on culture and would not amount to cultural
genocide, but it demonstrates a pattern of attempts at cultural suppression and destruction
which requires stronger protections for cultural components.165 Another instance in
which culture can be destroyed is through education, particularly state controlled public
education.166 Public education can shape history in such a way that it excludes parts that
it deems inappropriate or even reinforce negative stereotypes about cultures and
emphasize their supposed inferiority in order to get rid of the culture completely.167 For
example, in New Zealand, Maori children were physically beaten for speaking their
language at school until the 1950‟s.168 Although, this only represents a single practice in a
single country, it demonstrates the enormous power of a state to infiltrate all aspects of
life in order to get rid of a culture it deems inappropriate or inferior.
161
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Furthermore, in 1997 the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission determined that the forcible transfer of Aboriginal children to nonindigenous institutions and families constituted a form of cultural genocide.169 The
government took legal guardianship of all Aboriginal children and removed them from
their homes in order to assimilate them into European culture and society.170 Similar to
genocide, the lack of a large number of cases that can be defined as cultural genocide
does not exclude it from being labeled a crime. Whether or not a crime is prevalent
should not dictate whether or not it is criminalized, whether or not a crime is committed
once or a million times, it is a violation of rights and should be punished, especially when
dealing with something as grave as the attempted destruction of a cultural group. There is
a void in international law that allows the destruction of cultures to go unpunished; the
criminalization of cultural genocide can provide the necessary state accountability to
ensure rights protection.
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III. Defining Cultural Genocide
This section analyzes the necessity of a definition of cultural genocide. The definition of
cultural genocide that is created draws inspiration from the work of Raphael Lemkin, the
drafting of the Genocide Convention, and anthropological and legal views of culture.

A. The Necessity of a Definition
The problems with the current definition of Genocide require that the international
community makes changes in order to protect minority groups. The importance of culture
to our existence is even noted by the drafting committee,
The cultural bond was one of the most factors among those which united a national group and
that was so true that it was possible to wipe out a human group, as such, by destroying its
cultural heritage, while allowing the individual members of a group to survive. The physical
destruction of individuals was not the only possible form of genocide; it was not the
indispensable condition of that crime.171

Culture is an integral part of our lives and it is one of the major ways that groups are
distinguished. To deny this essential component of diversity is to be complicit in the
destruction of people's customs, values, religions, and ways of life. The current definition
of genocide is shaped by politics and self-interest and the resulting document is one that
is good at gaining signatories but insufficient at saving lives.172 The inclusion of the
forcible transfer of children as an offensive act demonstrates that cultural and physical
genocide are inextricably linked. 173
The convention itself and the preparatory works demonstrate the importance of
culture. This is also true in the application of the law, as trial chambers have also
explained the importance of culture and the link between cultural and physical
destruction. In the Kristic decision, the court found that the Serb forced knew that
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missing generations of men would impact the survival of a patriarchal society.174 By
recognizing the patriarchal make up of society, the tribunal recognized how culture
affects a group's existence.175 Specifically, attacking leadership does not physically
destroy the group immediately but rather, "[the perpetrator intends] to weaken the group
culturally, thereby facilitating its ultimate destruction."176 This idea is also presented in
the Blagojevic decision when the Trial Chamber notes,
[T]he physical or biological destruction of a group is not necessarily the death of the
group members. While killing large numbers of a group may be the most direct means of
destroying a group, other acts or series of acts, can also lead to the destruction of the
group.177

The Trial Chamber was analyzing the situation surround forced deportations and found
that even though acts don‟t necessarily cause death, they can be genocide when
conducted with the intent to destroy the group as a 'separate and distinct entity'.178
The varying expansions of the current definition in different courts, demonstrates
the need to reinterpret the definition of genocide.179 The result is distinct crimes that can
be applied universally to all instances of genocide without having to be re-interpreted to
convict perpetrators of crimes that may not be specified in the current convention.
Although some states fear an „expansion‟ of the definition of genocide, a restrictive
approach to defining genocide fails to account for differences between current genocides
and The Holocaust. The Holocaust was important part of the drafting of the Genocide
Convention, however included in the purpose of the Genocide Convention was the
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prevention of future genocides. The current definition of cultural genocide is insufficient
insofar as it fails to protect groups from non-physical means of destruction. The fear of
expanding the definition of genocide and losing the impact of the term is negated by the
fact that both physical and cultural genocide are the same insofar as they seek the
destruction of a group „in whole or in part.'180 Genocide whether physical or cultural is a
persecutory crime, where victims are targeted because of their membership in a distinct
group that the perpetrator wishes to destroy.181 The Genocide Convention was created in
an environment where states wanted to condemn the acts of Nazi Germany while creating
a definition that would prevent future acts. 182The political nature surrounding the
creation of the Genocide Convention resulted in a definition reminiscent of the atrocities
that occurred in Nazi Germany but failed to provide protection to all groups from
destruction. Restricting the definition to acts that are similar to the Holocaust requires
answering extremely difficult questions and setting arbitrary brightlines. The idea of
destroying a distinct group as stated during the drafting is a „supreme crime against
humanity‟183 and this requires the criminalization of the non-physical form of that
destruction.
The reasons for excluding cultural genocide from the Genocide Convention
included putting the protection of culture in the sphere of human rights, however pushing
cultural genocide into the realm of "human rights issues" fails to provide an
accountability mechanism that would ensure justice is served.184 A simple look at the
accountability mechanisms in human rights treaties demonstrates the lack of a sufficient
punishment especially when dealing with such grave crimes. Firstly, the international
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system is solely based on state cooperation, states will only agree to minimal restrictions
on their sovereignty.185 Ratifying a treaty expresses consent to be bound to that treaty and
the result is an international system that works on good will and treaties end up lacking
the necessary “teeth” to ensure strict enforcement.186 The implementation, or lack thereof,
of these treaties is a concern,
Implementation is a key problem in making the system of international protection of
human rights effective, and it has proved difficult and troublesome. The jurisdiction of
international courts depends upon the consent of the states involved, and few states have
given such consent with respect to disputes involving human rights. . . Consequently,
international human rights law like all international law, must rely heavily on voluntary
compliance by states, buttressed by such moral and other influence other countries
prepared to exert.187

The necessity for state cooperation means that human rights treaties are unable to do
much besides provide advice or make recommendations. The creation of international
criminal courts and tribunals establishes the possibility for holding individuals
responsible for the actions they take instead of simply making a written recommendation
to a state. These human rights treaties which are supposed to guarantee compliance once
they have been ratified have few means to ensure that states fulfill their obligations.
The enforcement mechanisms vary throughout international forums and there are
spaces for interstate and individual complaints.188 In relation to specific human rights
treaties, enforcement mechanisms are very similar. The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, it allows individuals to submit complaints to the Human Rights
Committee, and that ability comes through the optional protocol, not the original
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convention itself.189 The Human Rights Committee after evaluating a claim, they offer
their recommendations and they call upon states to take the necessary steps to ensure the
observance of the ICCPR.190 These steps can include ensuring that future violations don‟t
occur or even compensation to the victims for any harms suffered.191 However, due to
increasing pressure from victims, the Human Rights Committee adopted new measures
that would require reports within 180 days from states that have been found to have
violated the ICCPR as to what steps they have taken to comply with the
recommendations of the Committee.192 This change seems to important due to the fact a
deadline of 180 days was now in place, however once those 180 days expired, there were
no other actions that could be taken by the Committee. The problem with the efficacy of
this mechanism, or the lack thereof, is that there is not any actual punishment for those
who have violated the ICCPR, other that receiving a finger wagging from the Committee.
Submitting a report to a Committee about steps taken does nothing to ensure that the
grave violations of rights stop or that those who perpetrated said violations are held
accountable.
Outside of various treaty mechanisms, the United Nations itself has specific
enforcement mechanisms including the 1503 procedure and engaging a specific
rapporteur to research and report on specific violations.193 This however, still fails to
provide individual accountability for the grave violations that occur during cultural
genocide. Similarly to UNESCO, which serves as the major organization for the
protection of culture, there is no individual accountability but rather a dependence on
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reporting.194 UNESCO relies strongly on friendly settlement and does not have „strong
investigatory or oversight mechanism‟.195 The inability of UNESCO to prevent cultural
genocide or even punish those who are active participants is a travesty. The importance
of individual criminal responsibility is evident of international courts and tribunals, which
demonstrate the need to hold people accountable for massive rights violations. The
logical conclusion of the creation of the international courts and tribunals and their
growing importance is that the international community feels that it is vital to hold
individuals accountable for massive rights violations. With this as the foundation, it can
also be applied to the concept of cultural genocide insofar as the result is a massive
violation of rights that impacts not only the group targeted but all of humanity.
Furthermore, the definition of genocide poses some major problems when it
comes to protecting minorities and indigenous groups around the world. There are certain
aspects of the convention that are antiquated and simply missing that allows perpetrators
to get away with massive violations. The first problem is in the list of protected groups.
The convention protects racial groups, although it has currently been accepted that 'race'
does not exist as a scientific concept.196 Another problem is that the convention leaves
out cultural groups, which means that groups of people with shared values, languages,
and customs which may need an increased protection, particularly in Latin America and
Africa.197 Not only are the protected groups limited, but the entire definition is limited in
scope which means that there are a number of situations that seem to be genocide but do
not fit the definition provided.198 The fact that certain groups are not protected would
allow their destruction to potentially go unpunished to the fullest extent, "[i ]t would
reprehensible if the world would not condemn massive slaughter of members of a group .
. . simply because of a preordained idea of what types of groups are qualified for
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coverage under the [Genocide] Convention."199 Not only that, the convention also leaves
out political and social groups which does not allow for all actions to be condemned,
specifically the removal of Soviet civilians and the murder of homosexuals during the
holocaust.200 The fact that so many groups are left outside of the scope of the convention
means that they will have to turn to their respective national courts or tribunals for
justice, however the crimes would not have the stigma of genocide attached to it.201 The
problem with seeking justice at a national level is that if the genocidal plan is widespread
and systematic and being perpetrated by the government, then no legal recourse exists on
a local level.
The definition of genocide leaves the courts unable to make a decision about the
genocidal nature of a situation, which chills state action,
The limited legal meaning of genocide has been stretched by some courts to better
fit its rhetorical use. The consequence is a complex and uncertain law-Darfur
burned and bled whilst a legal determination of genocide was awaited. The
Genocide Convention describes with sufficient precision a single historical event,
an unimaginable, unrepeatable evil. But, in its modern application, the Genocide
Convention kills more people that it protects or prosecutes.202
The Genocide Convention stalls the international action and allows people to go
unpunished and allows crimes to continue which is antithetical to the entire idea of a
Genocide Convention. The lack of cohesive case law defining this crime and the fact that
it leaves so many groups unprotected necessitates, in my view, a revamping of the
convention and of the definition of genocide in its entirety. Looking at the convention
from two different angles, the need for change exists and this is apparent in both the
definition and the application of the law. The absence of cultural genocide from the
Genocide Convention and the inability of human rights treaties to pick up the pieces left
behind by the Convention leaves a gaping hole in international law and cultural rights
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protection. Not only has that, but the inherent problems in the current definition of
genocide demonstrate the importance of legal flexibility in its use in applying the law to
different violations.
The final problem is the Genocide Convention‟s focus on physical means of
destruction. This focus necessitates a separate definition of cultural genocide instead of
the addition of „cultural groups‟ to the current definition. The lack of the criminalization
of non-physical means of destructions leaves groups vulnerable to a type of destruction
that is part and parcel of a physical genocide plan but can also exist separately from a
physical genocidal plan. This protection would not be achieved by creating a new
category of „group‟ in the current definition of genocide. The difference between the
current definition of genocide and the proposed definition of cultural genocide is in the
acta rea, the criminalized acts. An addition of the category of „cultural groups‟ to the
current definition of genocide would fail to adequately address the non-physical means of
destructions associated with cultural genocide. The roots of the differentiation in the acta
rea of physical and cultural genocide can be seen not only in the work of Raphael
Lemkin but also in the proposed definitions of cultural genocide in the drafting of the
Genocide Convention.203 The definitions presented during the drafting of the Genocide
Convention took into consideration the major differences between physical and cultural
genocide in terms of the means of destruction. Therefore, a definition of cultural
genocide necessitates a separate list of acts that includes non-physical means of
destruction currently missing from the current definition of genocide, which focuses
mainly on physical destruction. The importance of culture to the human experience
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necessitates individual criminal responsibility especially when there is a systematic plan
to destroy a group „in whole or in part‟.204
B. Framing a Definition of Cultural Genocide
Understanding the complexities of the definition of genocide does not give us a
starting point to frame a definition of cultural genocide. In order to frame a working
definition of cultural genocide, an examination of culture needs to be undertaken.
Culture can be broadly defined,". . . learned and shared human patterns or models for
living: day to day living patterns. These patterns and models pervade all aspects of
human social interaction. Culture is mankind's primary adaptive mechanism.'205 It can
also be defined as "the material and ideological ways in which a group organizes,
understands, and reproduces its life as a group."206 The important aspects of culture are
language, religion, food, customs, and all are essential in defining a distinct group. In
order to create a functioning definition of cultural genocide, it is necessary to understand
the two parts of the term: culture and genocide. As stated in the previous chapter, culture,
for legal purposes, needs to be moved from an intellectual abstraction to a definition
characterized by components so that law can create a clear framework of protections. The
second part of the term, genocide, is necessary to understand because the principles
guiding this definition will be applied to the definition of cultural genocide. The reason
for this is that the definition of genocide as found in the Genocide Convention is
internationally accepted and applied as law. Furthermore, it provides understanding into
the world of special intent that is required for findings of genocide. Since cultural
genocide also deals with acts intending to destroy a group, the same special intent is
required.
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An open definition of genocide is essentially “a form of one-sided mass killing in
which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group.” 207 This very basic definition
of genocide clarifies the essence of genocide as a crime. The lynchpin of the entire
concept of genocide which separates it from simple murder or extermination as a war
crime is the specific intent to destroy a group. The definition of Genocide has two parts
essentially; the mens rea and the actus reus,
The prosecution must prove specific material facts, but must also establish the accused‟s
criminal intent or „guilty mind‟: actus non facit reum nisi mins sit rea. The definition of genocide
in the 1948 Convention invites this analysis, because it rather neatly separates the two elements.
The intital phrase or chapeau of article II addresses the mens rea of the crime of genocide, that is,
the „intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such‟.
The five sub-paragraphs of article II list the criminal acts or actus reus. The distinction between
actus reus and mens rea features in virtually all of the judgments of the international tribunals
that concern charges of genocide. It has even been extended into the realm of State
responsibility.208

Beginning with the actus reus, of genocide, the least controversial act was killing
members of the group.209 Even though murder was the least controversial act included,
there is no threshold on how much murder equals genocide; it is the combination of the
act and the intent that can lead to a determination of genocide.210 A higher number of
killings may make the case for genocide easier but there is not a limit that must be
reached before that determination is made, the impact of this is that even a small number
of killings can be genocide; the important part of the act is the intent.211The second act
defined is 'causing serious bodily or mental harm'; this comes from the Secretariat Draft
which included the prohibition of biological experiments and it was France that decided
that a more general view of bodily harm should be adopted.212 This has been expanded to
include rape and sexual violence based on the interpretation of the ICTR, which ruled
that "serious bodily or mental harm, without limiting itself thereto, to mean acts of
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torture, be they bodily or mental, inhumane or degrading treatment, persecution."213 The
third offense does not even require actual damage to be done, it simply requires that
actions are taken that are calculated to bring about the destruction of the group.214 The
provision aids in demonstrating that the convention recognized that there are means to
commit or attempt to commit genocide that does not involve murder. The fourth
offensive act stems from the use of sterilization and castration practices in Nazi Germany
and has even been expanded by the ICTR to include rape as well.215 The final offensive
act is the forcible transfer of children. This act is not similar to any of the previous acts as
its impact is solely cultural because, "Presumably, when children are transferred from one
group to another, their cultural identity may be lost. They will be raised within another
group, speaking its language, participating in its culture, and practicing its religion."216
Forced transfer of children was originally included as a part of the cultural genocide
provision in the original drafts as the transfers results in an immediate loss of culture and
not necessarily death or physical harm.217
Genocide is characterized by intent and the mens rea of genocide has two
components as defined in the Rome Statute Article 30; knowledge and intent.218 The first
part, knowledge "[m]eans awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will
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occur in the ordinary course of events."219 In this sense, knowledge simply means that
the perpetrator was privy to information about the plan or common design, this does not
mean that they have to have participated in designing or creating the plan.220 This should
also not be confused with the idea that the perpetrator has to be aware that the act
constitutes the crime of genocide itself, it requires only that the perpetrator is aware of the
genocidal policy or plan.221 Another way that knowledge can be proven is if the
prosecution can prove 'willful blindness.222 This means that if there is no proof that a
person knew of the exact plans, they could have sufficient knowledge of a genocidal
act.223 The second aspect of mens rea is intent, dolus specialis. This means that the
perpetrator means to engage in the specific act, however, in terms of genocide this also
means that the prosecutor has to prove that this intent was genocidal; otherwise the act
does not reach the threshold of genocide.224
C. Cultural Genocide Defined
With the understanding the culture and the current definition of genocide, the
work of defining cultural genocide can now begin. The framing of cultural genocide
must also take into account the purpose of a cultural genocide law in and of itself; it
exists to punish drastic measures intended to destroy a group and does not deal with non
forced assimilation. Even Raphael Lemkin specified that cultural genocide laws were
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aimed at drastic measures intending to destroy a group and not policies of assimilation
that do not intend the complete disappearance of a group.225 Furthermore, cultural
genocide acts can be a prelude to or appear in conjunction with physical genocide in
which there is no doubt that there is intent to destroy a group.226 These laws against
cultural genocide will not seek to prevent any form of cultural change as such changes
are inevitable. These changes result from increasing contact between cultures and various
changes cannot be prevented without complete isolation.227 Therefore, a working
definition of cultural genocide should take into account these differences and require a
level of special intent and specific actus reus that would prevent the abuse of the law.
The proposed change is a definition of cultural genocide that can either be added
as an amendment to the Genocide Convention or used as the foundation for a separate
convention on cultural genocide. The majority of the foundation of the current definition
of genocide will remain the same especially the mens rea. The reason for keeping the
mens rea the same for cultural genocide is to avoid a broad definition in which any
potential action could be labeled cultural genocide. That would result in a
destigmatization of the crime and therefore defeat the purpose of labeling the acts as
genocide in the first place.
The place to begin formulating the definition is through the original definitions
proposed by the drafting committee. The Secretariat Draft defined cultural genocide as
the following,
. . . the destruction of the specific character of the targeted group(s) through destruction or
expropriation of its means of economic perpetuation; prohibition or curtailment of its
language; suppression of its religious, social or political practices; destruction or denial of
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access to its religious or other sites, shrines or institutions; destruction or denial of use and
access to objects of sacred or sociocultural significance, forced dislocation; expulsion or
dispersal of its members; forced transfer or remove of its children, or any other means.228

The problem with this definition begins with the destruction of economic perpetuation.
There is no direct link between economic perpetuation and cultural boom. Secondly,
destruction of economic perpetuation does not in and of itself destroy the culture. A
working definition of cultural genocide should ensure that the acts have a direct link to
the destruction of a culture; otherwise the door for abuse remains wide open.
Furthermore, economic perpetuation is an extremely vague concept and would have
incredibly varying definitions worldwide. The next problem is the curtailment of
languages; this is where national assimilation policies will create tensions, pushback, and
problems.. Most states have assimilation policies that include provisions which state that
official language(s) are taught in all schools. This is where a working definition would
define the difference between moderate assimilation policies and cultural genocide. There
is a difference between having a national official language taught at school and imposing
measures to prevent a group from using their language with the intent to destroy it. For
example, in New Zealand, the Maori were punished for speaking their language in school
and that can be seen as a genocidal act, whereas simply having the English as the
language of instruction would not.229The analysis of the new definition would also be
sure to emphasize the dolus specialis that is required when determining genocide.
The next definition proposed was the draft committee during the Convention
meetings. It read,
In this convention, genocide also means any of the following deliberate acts committed
with the intention of destroying the language or culture of a national, racial, or religious
group on the grounds of national or racial origin or religious belief.
(1) prohibiting the use of language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools,
prohibiting the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group;
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(2) destroying, or preventing the use of, the libraries, museums, schools, historical
monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the
group.230

Due to the limited nature of this draft, it is the product of several negotiations and is
focused more on pleasing states than pressuring states to pursue an active plan of
protecting minority groups. This definition does take a step in the right direction by
stating that the intent is to destroy the language or culture which emphasizes dolus
specialis. The second positive step with this definition is the use of "or" between
"language" and "culture", which allows people who only target one aspect to still be
prosecuted. However, what needs to be included is religion, because people within a
single territory may have a similar language and culture, but a specific religion may be
targeted for destruction. The use of the phrase "based on . . . religious belief" in the text
does not have the same meaning. The current meaning of the text states that cultural
genocide is perpetrated there is an attempt to destroy language or culture based on
religious belief. That combination does not take into account situations where the only
difference is religious belief. The language should be clearer in order to ensure a
universal understanding of the acts that constitute cultural genocide.
Based on the previous drafts of a cultural genocide definition, the following is the
best definition that can be used as a framework to shape a more refined definition of
cultural genocide. This is by no means an exhaustive list of offensive acts that can
qualify as cultural genocide and this definition is by no means a legal working definition.
In this Convention, the act of genocide can also mean any of the following acts, with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the language, culture, or religion, of a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

Prohibiting the use of language of the group in daily intercourse or schools.
Destroying or prohibiting access to religious sites
Prohibiting the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group
Forced dislocation
Dispersal or expulsion of its members
Destroying or prohibiting access to libraries, museums, schools, historical
monuments.231
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This definition seeks a synthesis of the drafts of the definition of cultural genocide and
the current definition of genocide. The reason for separating the various acts is to ensure
that each offense can stand on its own as proof of cultural genocide. Just as in the current
definition, a perpetrator must not commit every single offensive act in order to be liable
for genocide. Secondly, offensive act (f) includes multiple acts because the destruction of
one of those cultural objects would not have significant enough impact on the culture
being targeted. The first five are separated because each act could lead to the destruction
of the targeted culture.
Therefore, I propose a definition which draws inspiration from the current
definition of genocide, the work of cultural experts, and the work of the drafting
committee of the Genocide Convention, in order to synthesize all of these ideas into a
working definition that can clearly provide a legal framework. The definition seeks to
bring in the components of culture in way that allows the law to be efficiently applied
with very little vagueness. The definition reads as it would in a convention;
Recognizing the importance and that the loss of cultural diversity harms all of humanity,
and,
Being convinced that cultural genocide is a precursor to physical genocide and is a
necessary component of crimes of genocide;
Cultural genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, religious, or linguistic group, as such:
(a) Prohibiting the use of language of the group
(b) Destroying the books, publications, or texts printed in the language of the
group or of religious works or the prohibition of new publications.
(c) Destroying or preventing the use of the libraries, museums, schools,
historical monuments, places of worship, or other cultural institutions and
objects of the group.
(d) Forced exile of members of the group
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(e) Forced dislocation.232

This definition is written from the perspective of a typical human rights treaty beginning
with broad statements about the purpose of the treaty and the foundation for what is laid
out within the text. I begin this particular definition explaining the importance of culture
to create the understanding from the beginning that the loss of culture impacts all of
humanity and not simply the targeted group. Secondly, the foundation is laid that
genocide is part and parcel of physical genocide and thus demonstrating the gravity of
cultural genocide and the necessity for punishment. The specific definition begins with
the statement that any of the acts are considered cultural genocide, this is to emphasize
that all of the acts do not have to happen simultaneously in order for a determination of
cultural genocide to be made. Similar, to the current definition of genocide, perpetrators
do not have to engage in all acts, although they may and most often do engage some or
even all acts simultaneously. The next section of the definition details the intent, which
is the same as the intent found in the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention.
The dolus specialis exists for the definition of cultural genocide as well because the crime
aims to eradicate a group. Furthermore, this special intent creates a brightline for the
determination of cultural genocide, so that only particularly grave crimes can be labeled
as cultural genocide. This definition uses the same groups as the Genocide Convention
because it covers a large spectrum of groups, thereby ensuring that vast amounts of
groups are protected. I further add the category of „linguistic groups‟ to cover cases in
which groups may have very similar cultural practices but are differentiated based on
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language or dialect. This is especially important because language is one of the most
essential components of culture and distinguishing groups.233 The specific acts listed are
based on the components of culture, and cultural heritage protected by UNESCO.234 The
acts listed seek to cover a broad range of possible violations that would have a direct
impact o the cultural integrity of the group. The last two acts listed, forced exile, and
forced dislocation are listed to cover acts in which cultural leaders are forced to separate
from their group as means to destroy the connection and thus the culture. Forced
dislocation is included because many groups, especially indigenous groups, have an
important bond to the land and separating a group from its home can directly destroy way
of life, artifacts and habits.235
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This definition is not flawless and it will not fix all of the problems with the
current definition of genocide nor close all gaps in cultural rights protection. Despite
suffering from the same problems of vagueness as the current definition of genocide, a
definition of cultural genocide faces another problem; that of distinguishing between an
act of genocide and that of a human rights violation. Although internationally
criminalized acts violate enumerated human rights, acts of cultural genocide have the
potential to be confused with general rights violations. This fear is seen in the drafting of
the Genocide Convention, when states argued that cultural genocide could be confused
with state policies of assimilation.236 An act that violates a groups‟ cultural right is
inherently discriminatory towards that group insofar as that group is targeted for a
limitation of their cultural expressions. Some might argue that this would make it easier
for every violation of a cultural right to be seen as cultural genocide. The possibility
exists, however just as every denial of the right to life is not genocide; every violation of
cultural rights is not genocide. Although a violation of a cultural right may be
discriminatory and may coincide with the proposed actus reus of cultural genocide, this
does not automatically mean that requirement of dolus specialis, special intent, has been
met. For example, a state policy that requires that all public schools be taught in the
official language may be seen as a violation of cultural rights; however that is different
from a policy that persecutes a particular group in their private use of the language of
their group. While, the first state policy attempts to create a uniformity of language in a
nationwide school system, the second has a significantly higher likelihood of being
attached to the intent to destroy that particular culture by exterminating its language. This
requires similar discretion based on legal facts similar to that used when labeling an act
as genocide. The same way in which every act claimed to be genocide is not labeled as
such, every act that can be seen socially as cultural genocide, may not meet the legal
requirements. This definition seeks to create a balance between legal pragmatism and the
intricacies of cultural protection.
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Culture as an essential part of each human and as the unique factor that
distinguishes one group from another must be protected. This paper is not an exhaustive
analysis of the concept of cultural genocide, nor does it provide a perfect working
definition of cultural genocide. This serves as a framework from which the international
community can gather ideas and information when drafting a new article that would
protect minority and indigenous groups. It is important to begin reanalyzing problems
with the prohibition of cultural genocide and reevaluating priorities in international law.
The work of protecting groups began with the creation of the Genocide Convention and
needs to be continued and expanded upon as groups are in danger of destruction through
non-physical means. Genocide ". . . shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great
losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these
human groups."237 It is because of the importance and value of ethno/cultural diversity
that the international community needs to end its obsession with body counts when it
comes to determining genocide and get back to the root of the crime; the destruction of a
unique and distinct human group.
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